Iran: Is a breakthrough really available?

  2013/11/19 source：china.org.cn

The recent Geneva negotiations of November 7-9 elicited the imagination of a breakthrough in Iran's nuclear standoff despite their ultimate failure. Such expectations were certainly reasonable since the positions of both sides on the issue have never been this close. However, a deal, which might really become available in the coming weeks or months, does not necessarily mean a breakthrough.

It is true that both the West and Iran face the urgency for a swift agreement. The West has its reasons to make Iran suspend its nuclear program as soon as possible. Iran has already been able to enrich its uranium with a purity of 20 percent and has managed to produce 196 kg of uranium at that level, according to the latest IAEA report. Such a development is widely regarded as the midway towards a nuclear bomb. An agreement could disrupt Iran's potential process of actually completing one.

Barack Obama's administration does understand the significance of a compromise with Iran, which is closely related to the resolution of almost all the major Middle East issues, from the Palestine-Israel peace process to the burning Syrian crisis and Afghanistan and Iraqi transformations. Never have there been two hostile countries with so many shared interests like the U.S. and Iran at this point.

The time for Hassan Rouhani to reach a deal with the West is also very limited. Media and academics felt surprised when President Rouhani initiated to solve the disputes within three to six months; yet Rouhani certainly understood that he might have only six. Shortly after his August inauguration, he gained the support from a most broad echelon, including the Supreme Leader and the Majlis despite the initial modest opposition. Such a favorable domestic atmosphere will last six months at most - going by the divisive nature of Iran's domestic politics.

Judging by the eagerness on both sides, it is not impossible that the coming November 20 negotiations will lead to a deal. Actually, most key parties have already expressed optimism. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, has revealed in an interview that there are no real differences on practical issues between the six-party negotiators and Iran. One senior U.S. official said on November 15, on condition of anonymity, that it is "quite possible" a deal could be reached.

However, an accord does not automatically entail a breakthrough. It is one thing to reach a deal, but quite another to implement it. In fact, the Eu3 did have a deal with Iran at the end of 2004, which prescribed that Iran suspended its nuclear program for six months in exchange for a package proposal from the EU. Nevertheless, the deal was aborted as Ahmadinejad rebooted its nuclear program in August of 2005.

The coming November 20 negotiations might deliver a deal, but even so, it is still early to proclaim a breakthrough as the obstacles also remain obvious. France's spoiling of the potential agreement at the last minute in the last round of the negotiations reflected one aspect of the complexity of nuclear politics. France might be more serious about non-proliferation issues, but its insistence and final decision to block the potential agreement certainly stem more from pressures from Saudi and other Gulf countries than anything else.

In addition to those Gulf monarchies, Israel is yet another player behind the talks. Just like the Gulf monarchies, Israel, though the only country in the Middle East carrying nuclear weapons, also regards Iran's nuclear program as a threat. While turning to France for help to sabotage a potential nuclear agreement just as the Gulf monarchies did, Israel also put a lot of pressure on the U.S. not to negotiate a deal with Iran.
Israel's role is tangible though Barack Obama's team seems to be resistant to Israel's illegitimate demands. For instance, key U.S. diplomats, including John Kerry and Wendy Sherman, do frequently visit Israel to assure Benjamin Netanyahu that the U.S. will not allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

It should be noted that several U.S. political forces also have their home-grown reasons to oppose warming up ties with Iran. The trauma of the 1979 hostage crisis remains the psychological source of anti-Iranism, which still defines the characteristics of the U.S. policy toward the country. The indigenous hostility, together with that of Israel, forms the domestic obstacle for a potential nuclear deal, which is specifically embodied in the strong opposition of U.S. congressmen.

The U.S. might be able to push for Iran's compliance on the table, but can it overcome the pressures from its allies and its conservative congressmen? To implement a potential agreement, if it is really available in the coming days, the U.S. will have to lift some of the sanctions. Yet most of the sanctions, including those on Iran's oil trade and financial sectors, come in the form of bills.

Obama and Kerry are certainly most capable politicians. But can they persuade Congress to lift those sanctions? This is doubtful. Remember how Congress is currently discussing new sanctions against Iran despite the optimism of the negotiation. It is through Congress that Jewish lobbyists actually play a significant role in U.S. domestic politics. And if sanctions are not significantly removed, how can Iran then take any further steps to suspend or reverse some of its nuclear activities according to the deal?
All in all, the U.S. might be able to pressure for Iran's compliance, but can it overcome the obstacles on its own side?